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5Uther’s Case (1947): Justice Dixon and the Troubled
Legacy of the Commonwealth Immunity Doctrine
stephen mcdonald and anne carter
I Introduction
Sir Owen Dixon has been remembered overwhelmingly as a ‘great’ judge,
and indeed as one of the greatest judges of the 20th century.1 His dissenting
judgment inRe Foreman& Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Commissioner of Taxation
(‘Uther’s Case’)2 has, in spite of considerable shortcomings, endured to
become a great dissent. In Uther’s Case, Dixon J rejected the prevailing
reciprocal understanding of the relationship between the Commonwealth
and the states and instead developed a doctrine that placed the Common-
wealth in a privileged position. His conception of the Commonwealth’s
immunity from state laws, which was ultimately accepted and applied by
a majority of the High Court in 1962 in Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty
Ltd (in liq) (‘Cigamatic’),3 has had a lasting impact. Despite a wealth of
academic criticism, the Court has declined4 to overrule what has been
described as a problematic5 and even heretical6 doctrine. In this chapter
1 See, eg, I D F Callinan, ‘Comment on Philip Ayres’s Article: Dixon’s View of the Privy
Council’ (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 18, 21. David Ritter notes that the quality
perhaps most commonly ascribed to Dixon is that of ‘greatness’, and documents various
examples: see David Ritter, ‘The Myth of Sir Owen Dixon’ (2004) 9 Australian Journal of
Legal History 249, 253; David Ritter, ‘Greatness as Measure? Recent Writings on the High
Court of Australia’ (2004) 50 Australian Journal of Politics and History 434.
2 (1947) 74 CLR 508. 3 (1962) 108 CLR 372.
4 Invitations to the High Court to overrule Cigamatic were declined in Maguire v Simpson
(1977) 139CLR362 andReResidential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parteDefenceHousing
Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410 (‘Residential Tenancies Tribunal’).
5 Anne Twomey, ‘Federal Limitations on the Legislative Power of the States and the Com-
monwealth to Bind One Another’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 507, 529.
6 R P Meagher and W M C Gummow, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’s Heresy’ (1980) 54 Australian Law
Journal 25.
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we examine various factors that have enabled Dixon J’s dissent in Uther’s
Case to prevail.
The majority in Uther’s Case held, consistently with previous cases,7
that, subject to inconsistent Commonwealth legislation, state laws could
validly apply to the Commonwealth. The state legislation in question was
a New SouthWales Act which provided for a priority order of debts in the
case of the winding up of a company.8 Under the legislation, claims for
Commonwealth sales tax and payroll tax were in the class of unsecured
debts to be paid after the payment of other specified debts. The majority
held that it was within the constitutional competence of New SouthWales
to restrict or abolish the prerogative right of the Commonwealth in this
way. Justice Dixon disagreed, holding that the state legislation was invalid
in its application to the Commonwealth. As is explained below, Dixon J’s
reasoningwas underpinned by his comparatively well-formed conception
of the Australian federation. Although that was ‘necessarily a dual system’,
in Dixon J’s view it was one in which the Commonwealth had ‘supremacy’
because of the Constitution’s affirmative grant of power to legislate with
respect to specific topics and the paramountcy accorded to federal laws
by s 109 of the Constitution.9
Fifteen years later, Dixon J’s dissent in Uther’s Case was ultimately
adopted by the Court in Cigamatic.10 By that time, Dixon had been Chief
Justice for a decade. He was ‘perhaps at the height of his powers’,11 and
was able to command the support of four other Justices. The facts of
Cigamaticwere very similar to those ofUther’s Case, and a majority of the
Court joined with Dixon CJ in overruling the earlier decision, holding
that the state companies legislation could not alter the priority of the
Commonwealth in the order of the payment of debts.12
In this chapter we explore various interrelated factors that have con-
tributed to the enduring legacy of Dixon J’s dissenting reasons. First,
7 See, eg, Pirrie v McFarlane (1925) 36 CLR 170; West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW)
(1937) 56 CLR 170.
8 Companies Act 1936 (NSW) s 297. 9 Uther’s Case (1947) 74 CLR 508, 529.
10 (1962) 108 CLR 372, 378 (Dixon CJ; Kitto and Windeyer JJ agreeing), 389 (Menzies J;
Kitto and Owen JJ agreeing), 390 (Windeyer J). See also Commonwealth v Bogle (1953) 89
CLR 229, 259–60 (Fullagar J; Dixon CJ, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ agreeing).
11 H P Lee, ‘Cigamatic Case’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and GeorgeWilliams (eds),
The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 95,
95.
12 (1962) 108 CLR 372. Justices McTiernan and Taylor dissented, holding that the Court
should not overrule Uther’s Case.
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we examine Dixon J’s conception of the Australian federation, including
his conviction concerning the inappropriateness of a state regulating the
legal relations of the Commonwealth with its own subjects. Second, we
discuss Dixon’s influence as Chief Justice of the Cigamatic Court, which
facilitated the adoption by the Court of what in 1947 had been a minority
view. This includes some reflections on Dixon CJ’s intellectual leader-
ship of the Court and also the changing dynamics of the Court over this
period. Third, and linked to the second point, the continuing reverence
for Dixon that continues to the present day has helped to entrench and
cement his view of the nature of the federation. Fourth, we consider the
centralising imbalance inherent in the doctrine, in contrast to the earlier
reciprocal approaches, and how this corresponds with the political reality
of the ascendancy of Commonwealth power in the federation. To con-
clude, we offer a brief examination of the influence of Dixon J’s dissent
in the cases since Cigamatic, contending that despite the possible dilution
of the Commonwealth immunity doctrine, Dixon J’s reasoning inUther’s
Case, as accepted in Cigamatic, remains important.
II Justice Dixon’s Conception of the Federation
According to Dixon J, the state legislation considered in Uther’s Case
sought to regulate the relationship between the Commonwealth and
its own subjects. Central to his dissent was the proposition that it is
exclusively for the Commonwealth, and not the states, to regulate rela-
tions between the Commonwealth government and its subjects: ‘to define
or regulate the rights or privileges, duties or disabilities, of the Common-
wealth in relation to the subjects of the Crown is not a matter for the
States’.13 The appeal of Dixon J’s position lies in this simple, fundamental
and at least superficially attractive proposition.
Justice Dixon, at least by 1947, seems to have possessed within his own
mind a relatively well-formed conception of the Australian federation.14
As Professor Leslie Zines observed, Dixon J’s dissent inUther’s Case rested
13 Uther’s Case (1947) 74 CLR 508, 528.
14 The development of Dixon J’s views can be traced through his judgments. See, eg,
Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 CLR 319, 390;
West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 657, 682–3; Federal Commissioner
of Taxation v E O Farley Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 278, 308; Essendon Corporation v Criterion
Theatres Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 1, 22.
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on his particular theory of federalism,15 which both built upon and
qualified the approach established by Amalgamated Society of Engineers
v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (‘Engineers’ Case’)16 in 1920. That case had,
of course, exploded the previously prevailing doctrines of reserved state
legislative powers and the implied immunity of state and Commonwealth
instrumentalities. The Court instead established a rule that the enumer-
ated grants of legislative power to the Commonwealth were generally to
be understood as authorising legislation applying to the states and their
agents and instrumentalities. The principle was generally thought to be
reciprocal.17
We can only speculate as to the genesis of Dixon’s federal vision. It
appears to have been driven, at least in part, by his dissatisfaction with
aspects of the Engineers’ Case.18 It may well have been influenced by his
experiences and views formed as a barrister appearing in the High Court
in the decades either side of the Engineers’ Case.
Fundamentally, Dixon ‘conceive[d] a State as deriving from the law; not
the law as deriving fromaState’.19 Australian governments and legislatures
were subordinate to the Constitution and the rule of law.20 Each of the
states and the Commonwealth were conceived of as ‘governments sepa-
rately organised’: ‘[t]he Constitution predicates their continued existence
as independent entities’.21 While neither a states-righter nor an arch-
federalist, within this framework Dixon elevated the Commonwealth to
a position of superiority over the states and accepted an approach to
15 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 491;
Leslie Zines, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’s Theory of Federalism’ (1965) 1 Federal Law Review 221.
16 (1920) 28 CLR 129.
17 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 155 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ); Zines, The
High Court and the Constitution, above n 15, 488. Keven Booker and Arthur Glass have
suggested that, while this is generally how the Engineers’ Case has been interpreted, the
judgment is not definitive on this point: see Keven Booker and Arthur Glass, ‘The Engi-
neers Case’ in H P Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) 34, 59.
18 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Marshall and the Australian Constitution’ in Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting
Pilate and Other Papers, collected by Severin Woinarski (William S Hein, 2nd ed, 1997)
166, 171; Zines, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’s Theory of Federalism’, above n 15, 223–4; Sir Daryl
Dawson and Mark Nicholls, ‘Sir Owen Dixon and Judicial Method’ (1986) 15 Melbourne
University Law Review 543, 550.
19 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Sources of Legal Authority’ in Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and Other
Papers, collected by Severin Woinarski (William S Hein, 2nd ed, 1997) 198, 199.
20 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J).
21 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82 (Dixon J) (‘Melbourne
Corporation’).
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the interpretation of constitutional grants of power which facilitated the
continuing expansion of central power.22
Justice Dixon’s theory of intergovernmental relations began with the
proposition –which is far from self-evident and seemingly in tensionwith
the thrust of theEngineers’ Case23 – that ‘[i]n a dual political systemyoudo
not expect to find either government legislating for the other’.24 However,
consistently with the reasoning in the Engineers’ Case, the existence of
express and affirmative grants of legislative power to the Commonwealth
was held to displace this basic proposition, as far as Commonwealth
legislation binding the states was concerned. The legislative powers of the
states, being general and residual, rather than specific and affirmatively
granted by the Constitution, remained subject to the general proposition
against ‘legislating for’ the Commonwealth.
In his judgment in Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (‘Mel-
bourne Corporation’), a decision delivered the day before argument in
Uther’s Case commenced, Dixon J had observed that what a state may do
with reference to the federal government and what the Commonwealth
might do with reference to the states were ‘two quite different questions’,
affected by different considerations.25 Although the decision inMelbourne
Corporation depended upon an implication limiting the legislative power
of the Commonwealth to control the states, Dixon J’s judgment empha-
sised the strength of the Commonwealth vis-a-vis the states:
The position of the federal government is necessarily stronger than that
of the States. The Commonwealth is a government to which enumerated
powers have been affirmatively granted. The grant carries all that is proper
22 See, eg, Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, 81, 85
(Dixon J); Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 332–4 (Dixon J);
R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte Australian National Airways
Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 225–6. But the breadth of federal powers would nevertheless
be constrained by textual and purposive considerations: cf R v Brislan; Ex parte Williams
(1935) 54 CLR 262.
23 As Anne Twomey has commented, ‘[i]t is difficult to understand how the majority judg-
ment in the Engineers’ case can be used to support the proposition that the Common-
wealth’s enumerated powers can be used to bind the States, without recognizing that it
also rejected the proposition that one polity cannot legislate to bind the other’: Twomey,
above n 5, 526.
24 Uther’s Case (1947) 74 CLR 508, 529. Note the use of the second person – a technique
employed by Dixon for declamatory effect; cf R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Soci-
ety of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ)
(‘Boilermakers’ Case’).
25 (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82.
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for its full effectuation. Then supremacy is given to the legislative powers
of the Commonwealth.
These two considerations add great strength to the implication protect-
ing the operation of State law affecting the exercise of federal power. But
they also amplify the field protected. Further, they limit the claim of the
State to protection from the exercise of Commonwealth power.26
In his dissent inUther’s CaseDixon J gave effect to this reasoning by hold-
ing that the powers of the states didnot extend to abolishing theCommon-
wealth’s ‘fiscal right’27 to priority in payment of debts. The states, being
unable to point to any affirmative grant of power (such as the Common-
wealth power to make laws with respect to bankruptcy and insolvency),
were thus said to be in a weaker position than the Commonwealth.28
In Dixon J’s conception, the inability of the states to legislate so as
to regulate relations between the Commonwealth and its subjects was
not said to be implied from the Constitution. Rather, Dixon J focussed,
unconvincingly,29 upon the absence of any affirmative grant of power to
the states to legislate for the Commonwealth. Having observed that the
general legislative power of the states was ‘diminished and controlled’ by
the Constitution, he continued:
[I]t is not a question whether the power of the Parliament of a Colony
becoming a State continues as at the establishment of the Commonwealth.
The Colony of New South Wales could not be said at the establishment
of the Commonwealth to have any power at all with reference to the
Commonwealth. Like the goddess of wisdom the Commonwealth uno ictu
sprang from the brain of its begetters armed and of full stature. At the
same instant the Colonies became States; but whence did the States obtain
the power to regulate the legal relations of this new polity with its subjects?
It formed no part of the old colonial power. The Federal Constitution does
not give it. Surely it is for the peace, order and good government of the
Commonwealth, not for the peace, welfare and good government of New
SouthWales, to say what shall be the relative situation of private rights and
of the public rights of the Crown representing the Commonwealth, where
they come into conflict. It is a question of the fiscal and governmental
26 Ibid 82–3.
27 An expression used by Dixon J in bothUther’s Case (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531 andCigamatic
(1962) 108 CLR 372, 377, 378.
28 Uther’s Case (1947) 74 CLR 508, 529. See also Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR
575, 611–12 (Dixon CJ) (‘Second Uniform Tax Case’).
29 See text accompanying nn 32–43 below.
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rights of the Commonwealth and, as such, is one over which the State has
no power.30
It is a measure of the influence of Dixon J’s reasoning in Uther’s Case
that all of the majority Justices in Cigamatic, not just Dixon himself, were
content largely to adopt his reasons in the earlier decision without further
elaboration.31 Thus it is essentially Dixon J’s initial reasoning in Uther’s
Case that has, through its adoption in Cigamatic, had lasting significance.
The resulting ‘Cigamatic doctrine’ has prompted a long line of critique
from both academic and practising lawyers.32 The constitutional basis
for the doctrine has been questioned repeatedly, with John Doyle QC
(when Solicitor-General for South Australia) concluding frankly that ‘the
basis of Cigamatic is unclear, and to the extent it can be discerned, not
persuasive’.33
Justice Dixon’s reasoning, focusing on the absence of any affirmative
specific grants of power to the states, failed to acknowledge the true
natureof plenary state legislativepower.34 In addition, commentators have
pointed out that the ‘supremacy’ derived from s 109 of the Constitution
does not support any general implication of Commonwealth superiority
or immunity.35 R P Meagher and WM C Gummow, in their well-known
1980 article, argued that the doctrine represented a ‘revival in fresh garb
of one aspect of the immunity of instrumentalities doctrine’ that was
rejected in the Engineers’ Case.36
30 Melbourne Corporation (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82–3.
31 (1962) 108 CLR 372, 378 (Dixon CJ; Kitto and Windeyer JJ agreeing), 389 (Menzies J;
Kitto and Owen JJ agreeing), 390 (Windeyer J).
32 See, eg, Geoffrey Sawer, ‘State Statutes and the Commonwealth’ (1961) 1 University of
Tasmania Law Review 580; W M C Gummow, ‘The Nature and Operation of Prerogative
Powers in the Federal System: The Commonwealth of Australia v Cigamatic Pty Ltd’ (1964)
4 Sydney Law Review 435; Gareth Evans, ‘Rethinking Commonwealth Immunity’ (1972)
8 Melbourne University Law Review 521; Meagher and Gummow, above n 6, 25; J J
Doyle, ‘1947 Revisited: The Immunity of the Commonwealth from State Law’ in Geoffrey
Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law (Federation Press, 1994)
47; Twomey, above n 5, 526 ff; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 15,
488 ff.
33 Doyle, above n 32, 49.
34 See Sawer, above n 32, 585–6; Evans, above n 32, 524–5; Meagher and Gummow, above
n 6, 28; Doyle, above n 32, 62–3; Twomey, above n 5, 526; Zines, The High Court and the
Constitution, above n 15, 497; Ronald Sackville, ‘The Doctrine of Immunity of Instrumen-
talities in the United States and Australia: A Comparative Analysis’ (1969) 7 Melbourne
University Law Review 15, 62.
35 See, eg, Twomey, above n 5, 528. 36 Meagher and Gummow, above n 6, 29.
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The obscurities surrounding the application of the doctrine have led
to it being described as ‘almost unworkable’.37 These difficulties arise
because the precise scope of the Commonwealth’s immunity which was
recognised by Dixon J in Uther’s Case, and by the majority in Cigamatic,
was, and has remained, unclear. The absence of a logical foundation for
the doctrine in the Constitution precludes resolution of such uncertainty
by reference to first principles.
In Uther’s Case itself, Dixon J acknowledged that ‘[g]eneral laws made
by a Statemay affix legal consequences to given descriptions of transaction
and the Commonwealth, if it enters into such a transaction, may be
bound by the rule laid down’.38 Likewise, in Commonwealth v Bogle,
Fullagar J (Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ agreeing) maintained that ‘the
State Parliament has no power over the Commonwealth’,39 yet recognised
that ‘[t]he Commonwealth may, of course, become affected by State laws’,
giving the example of a contract entered into inVictoria, inwhich case ‘the
terms and effect of that contract may have to be sought in the Goods Act
1928 (Vict)’.40 And in Cigamatic, Dixon CJ distinguished state legislative
power ‘to control or abolish a federal fiscal right’ and state power ‘tomake
some general law governing the rights and duties of those who enter in
to some description of transaction, such as the sale of goods, and of the
Commonwealth in its executive arm choosing to enter into a transaction
of that description’.41 This ‘affected by’ aspect of the doctrine was also the
subject of much commentary and criticism,42 and would eventually be
rejected.43
III Chief Justice Dixon’s Influence over the Cigamatic Court
By the time ofCigamatic, Dixon CJ’s influence over the Court was consid-
erable and his conception of the nature of the federation was endorsed by
a majority of the Court. Dixon was, by all accounts, a towering figure on
the Australian High Court. After being called to the Bar in 1910, he first
appeared before the High Court in December 1911 at the age of 25. Dixon
quickly developed a formidable reputation and took silk in 1922. Despite
37 Doyle, above n 32, 47. 38 (1947) 74 CLR 508, 528. 39 (1953) 89 CLR 229, 259.
40 Ibid 260. 41 (1947) 108 CLR 372, 378.
42 See, eg, Colin Howard, ‘Some Problems of Commonwealth Immunity and Exclusive
Legislative Powers’ (1972) 5 Federal Law Review 31; Grant Donaldson, ‘Commonwealth
Liability to State Law’ (1985) 16 University of Western Australia Law Review 135; Zines,
The High Court and the Constitution, above n 15, 494–6.
43 Residential Tenancies Tribunal (1997) 190 CLR 410.
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his success at the Bar, Dixon was hesitant to accept a judicial appoint-
ment and in 1926 declined offers of a permanent position on the Supreme
Court of Victoria and the role of Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Court
of Conciliation and Arbitration.44 In 1929, aged 42, he somewhat reluc-
tantly accepted appointment to theHighCourt.45 Hewas appointedChief
Justice in 1952 following the retirement of Sir JohnLatham.Dixon’s tenure
on the Court spanned 35 years, though it was punctuated by two diplo-
matic postings: one as Australian Minister to Washington between April
1942 and September 1944, and one as UN-appointed mediator between
India and Pakistan in 1950.46
Although Dixon disliked judicial work,47 describing it as hard and
unrewarding,48 his contribution to the Court, and to Australian law, is
immense.49 As a member of the High Court for three-and-a-half decades,
Dixon was known and celebrated for many things, most famously, per-
haps, his professed judicial method of ‘strict and complete legalism’.50 It
is now rarely remembered that in his early days on the Court Dixon was
known as the ‘Great Dissenter’,51 due mainly to a series of dissents in the
1930s in relation to s 92 of the Constitution.52 But when the entire period
of his service on the Court is considered, Dixonwas a relatively infrequent
dissenter. It has been calculated that in his 35 years on the High Court he
44 Grant Anderson and Sir Daryl Dawson, ‘Dixon, Sir Owen (1886–1972)’ in Australian
Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne University Press, 1996) vol 14; Philip Ayres, Owen
Dixon (Miegunyah Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 50, 53.
45 J DMerralls, ‘The Rt Hon Sir Owen Dixon, OM, GCMG, 1886–1972’ (1972) 46 Australian
Law Journal 429, 430; Ayres, above n 44, 54.
46 Kenneth Hayne, ‘Dixon, Owen’ in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper and George Williams
(eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press,
2001) 218.
47 See, eg, Ayres, above n 44, 62–3, 70–1, 235. 48 Ibid 219.
49 See, eg,WMCGummow,Change and Continuity: Statute, Equity and Federalism (Oxford
University Press, 1999) xvii.
50 Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Address upon Taking the Oath of Office in Sydney as Chief Justice of
the High Court of Australia on 21st April, 1952’ in Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and
Other Papers, collected by Severin Woinarski (William S Hein, 2nd ed, 1997) 247, 249. See
also Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Concerning Judicial Method’ in Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate and
Other Papers (William S Hein, 2nd ed, 1997) 152, 153–4. For some discussion of Dixon’s
judicial method, see Dawson and Nicholls, above n 18, 543.
51 Graham Fricke, Judges of the High Court (Hutchinson, 1986) 118. This point is also noted
in the discussion of Dixon’s reputation in Andrew Lynch, ‘Unrequited but Still Great: The
Dissent of Justices Dixon and Evatt in R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein
(1938)’ in ch 3 of this book.
52 See Willard v Rawson (1933) 48 CLR 316; R v Vizzard; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30; O
Gilpin Ltd v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1935) 52 CLR 189;
Bessell v Dayman (1935) 52 CLR 215.
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delivered 1699 judgments, and that in just 5.5 per cent of these (94) did
he find himself in dissent.53
The adoption of Dixon J’s dissenting views by a majority of the Court
in Cigamatic can be explained partly on the basis of the influence that
Dixon CJ wielded by that time.54 While some dissenting judgments can
be seen as appealing to the sympathies of a future Court or as recording
a defeated argument for the sake of posterity, Dixon’s long tenure on the
Court and his eventual dominancemeant that he personally presided over
the vindication of his dissent in Uther’s Case. By 1962, Dixon had been
on the Court for more than three decades, including a decade as Chief
Justice. His intellect and legal ability, across all areas of the Court’s work,
commanded respect and contributed to his ‘intellectual dominance’ over
the Court.55 Chief Justice Dixon also worked to generate consensus on
the Court, in contrast to some of his predecessors. This included the
circulation of draft judgments to the other members of the Court.56 As
Sir Douglas Menzies later reflected:
His authority was, of course, enormous, and when he was concerned that a
decision should go in a particular way, his aimwas to get his own judgment
out first for circulation to other members of the Court. To differ from him
was a course always taken with hesitation and never without foreboding.57
Chief Justice Dixon’s influence was acknowledged in the insightful and
prescient observation of Geoffrey Sawer, writing in 1961 about the theory
of Commonwealth immunity favoured by Dixon J in Uther’s Case and by
Fullagar J in Commonwealth v Bogle:58
In view of the success which Sir Owen Dixon has had in establishing as
doctrine what were once obiter dicta or dissents in judgments given by
him, we may assume that if a suitable case arises, the doctrine will be very
strongly pressed, and although the Chief Justice does not hold a position
comparable with that ofMarshall CJ in his hey-day, there is nevertheless an
antecedent probability that a view held by him will command a majority;
53 Matthew Groves and Russell Smyth, ‘A Century of Judicial Style: Changing Patterns in
Judgment Writing on the High Court 1903–2001’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 255,
table 1.
54 Sackville, above n 34, 60.
55 Colin Howard, ‘Sir Owen Dixon and the Constitution’ (1973) 9Melbourne University Law
Review 5, 5.
56 Ayres, above n 44, 57.
57 Sir Douglas Menzies, ‘The Right Honourable Sir Owen Dixon, OM GCMG’ (1973) 9
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 3.
58 (1953) 89 CLR 229.
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its chance of doing so is, to say the least of it, not reduced by its having the
support of Fullagar J as well.59
In addition, the Court at the time of the Cigamatic judgment was a
very different place than it had been in earlier years. When Dixon J was
appointed in 1929 the Court was divided and fractured.60 Divisions and
disagreement were prevalent, and reportedly Dixon J was for a time the
only member of the Court to whom all of the others regularly spoke.61
Justice Starke was particularly critical of Evatt and McTiernan JJ, refer-
ring to them as ‘the parrots’ on account of their tendency to agree with
Dixon J.62 Justice Starke also refused to discuss or circulate his draft judg-
ments to the other members of the Court, sending his judgments to the
Registrar in a sealed envelope with instructions not to open them until
the day of judgment delivery.63 By the time of Cigamatic, the composi-
tion of the Court had changed considerably and many of the personal
divisions between judges had diminished with Dixon CJ at the helm.64
These changing internal dynamics, combined with Dixon CJ’s influence,
help to explain why his dissenting judgment – although scarcely an exem-
plar of the ‘strict and complete legalism’ which he espoused in ‘federal
conflicts’65 – was ultimately adopted by a majority of the Court.
IV Precedent and Continuing Reverence for Sir Owen Dixon
In the decades since Cigamatic, the doctrine developed by Dixon J in
Uther’s Case remains accepted by the Court, despite the considerable
criticism it has generated. This ongoing legacy can be understood in
part, we suggest, by the Court’s commitment to precedent, its unwilling-
ness to address constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary, and the
reverence for Dixon that continues to the present day.
59 Sawer, above n 32, 583. 60 Ayres, above n 44, 56. 61 Ibid 57.
62 Clem Lloyd, ‘Not Peace but a Sword! – The High Court under J G Latham’ (1987) 11
Adelaide Law Review 175, 181.
63 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The High Court of Australia: A Personal Impression of its First 100
Years’ (2003) 27Melbourne University Law Review 864, 874.
64 Ibid 875. Matthew Groves and Russell Smyth have noted that the dissent rate in the Dixon
Court was lower than it had been for most of the period that Latham was Chief Justice:
Groves and Smyth, above n 53, 271.
65 Dixon, ‘Address upon Taking the Oath of Office as Chief Justice of the High Court of
Australia’, above n 50, 249.
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Sir Owen Dixon occupies an almost hallowed place in Australian legal
history. During his lifetime he received numerous honours and awards,
and the Court over which he presided was well regarded throughout the
common law world.66 Since his retirement and death the accolades have
continued, and there is a voluminous academic literature documenting
his contribution. His reputation has by now become steeped in mythol-
ogy, and despite some attempts to present a more nuanced approach
by pointing to flaws or criticisms,67 his reputation remains almost
untouchable.68
This immense reputation, in combination with the doctrine of prece-
dent, perhaps helps to explain the judicial reluctance to overturn, or even
squarely to confront, the Commonwealth immunity doctrine. Although
the High Court is not bound by its own decisions, the doctrine of prece-
dent retains importance. The precise relationship between judicial dissent
and a willingness to overrule previous decisions is a slippery one, in part
because the application of precedent in a final court is fluid.69 Dixon
himself was a strong advocate of the importance of precedent and of the
view that the Court should only overrule its own decisions in exceptional
circumstances.70 InCigamatic itself, Dixon CJ only saw the need to depart
from Uther’s Case in relation to the specific issue on which he thought
the majority had fallen into ‘fundamental error’.71 Dixon’s approach to
precedent, enshrined through his exposition of the judicial method, has
permeated current conceptions of the judicial task.72 That Dixon J was the
main proponent of the Commonwealth immunity doctrine has certainly
enhanced its precedential force.73
66 See, eg, Mason, above n 63, 878; Sir Garfield Barwick, ‘The Late Sir Owen Dixon’ (1972)
126 CLR v, ix.
67 See, eg, LaurenceWMaher, ‘Tales of the Overt and the Covert: Judges and Politics in Early
Cold War Australia’ (1993) 21 Federal Law Review 151; Dennis Rose, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’
(2003) 6 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 18.
68 Ritter, ‘The Myth of Sir Owen Dixon’, above n 1.
69 Andrew Lynch, ‘Dissent: The Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreements in the High
Court of Australia’ (2003) 27Melbourne University Law Review 724.
70 Dawson andNicholls, above n 18, 548–52;Wright vWright (1948) 77 CLR 191, 210 (Dixon
J).
71 (1962) 108CLR 372, 377, 379. For anotherwell-known instance inwhichDixonCJ refused
to adhere to precedent in respect of propositions which he regarded as both ‘misconceived
and wrong’ and ‘fundamental’, see Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610, 632.
72 Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Activism? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation’ (2004) 24
Australian Bar Journal 219, 221.
73 See Australian Postal Commission v Dao (1985) 3 NSWLR 565, 598 (McHugh JA).
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After Cigamatic, the Court deferred invitations to reconsider that deci-
sion through reliance on an expansive construction of s 64 of the Judiciary
Act 1903 (Cth).74 That section provides:
In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of
the parties shall as nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be
given and costs awarded on either side, as in a suit between subject and
subject.
This enables state laws, which might otherwise fall foul of Cigamatic, to
be applied as if they were Commonwealth laws. By the operation of s 64
the Commonwealth has, in effect, voluntarily placed itself (in most civil
cases at least) in the same legal position that would have obtained had the
Commonwealth immunity doctrine not existed.
A consequence has been that the Commonwealth immunity doctrine
has rarely called for direct application, but has remained an accepted part
of Australian constitutional law for decades. By the time the opportunity
did arise for reconsidering the doctrine, in a case involving a decision of a
state administrative tribunal (rather than a state court exercising federal
jurisdiction), and thus not attracting the operation of s 64 of the Judiciary
Act,75 the decision in Cigamatic had stood for some 35 years.
The result is that Dixon J’s fundamental propositions concerning the
nature of the federation, which underpin the Commonwealth immunity
doctrine, have remained part of the fabric of Australian constitutional law.
As such, they have continued to exert a broad influence on the outlook
and decisions of the Court, despite the very limited direct application of
the doctrine itself.
V Centralising Power and Accord with Political Reality
The resilience of Dixon J’s dissent in Uther’s Case and its progeny, the
Commonwealth immunity doctrine, may also be explained in part by its
apparent congruity with the political realities of the Australian federation
in the modern era.
74 Maguire v Simpson (1977) 139 CLR 362, 390 (Gibbs J), 402 (Mason J), 403–4 (Jacobs J);
Commonwealth v Evans Deakin Industries Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 254, 267 (Gibbs CJ, Mason,
Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ); cf Australian Postal Commission v Dao (1987) 162 CLR
317. See also KeithMason, ‘Has Engineers Reached its “Use-By” Date? A State Perspective’
inMichael Coper andGeorgeWilliams (eds),HowMany Cheers for Engineers? (Federation
Press, 1997) 123, 124–5.
75 Residential Tenancies Tribunal (1997) 190 CLR 410.
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The supremacy of Commonwealth legislation by reason of s 109 of
the Constitution meant that the rejection of the doctrine of implied gov-
ernmental immunities in the Engineers’ Case was of ‘more benefit to the
Commonwealth than the States’.76 A central tenet of the Engineers’ Case
doctrine was that the express grants of legislative power to the Common-
wealthwere to be interpreted according to ordinary principles of statutory
construction andnot subject to anypresumption against interferencewith
the states. Thus, with s 109 giving primacy to Commonwealth laws, the
Engineers’ Case had the immediate effect of strengthening the position of
the Commonwealth and centralising power.
With some notable but relatively minor exceptions,77 the trend of
subsequent decisions concerning legislative power has been to accept the
expansion of federal power through the application of a liberal approach
to the construction of the enumerated grants of legislative power to the
Commonwealth,78 at the expense of the states.79 These developments both
supported and reflected the political reality of the gradual ascendancy
of central power in Australia. To adopt one aspect of what Windeyer J
famously said of the Engineers’ Case, they have been ‘a consequence of
developments that had occurred outside the law courts as well as a cause
of further developments there’.80
The approach adopted by Dixon J in Uther’s Case, and ultimately the
decision in Cigamatic, while apparently running counter to the justifica-
tion given in the Engineers’ Case itself, is consistent with the trend towards
the amplification of central power in the Australian federation. There
has been little incentive for High Court judges, regarded generally as
76 Zines, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’s Theory of Federalism’, above n 15, 221–2.
77 See, eg, New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482 (‘Incorporation Case’);
Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416.
78 See, eg, R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tas); Ex parte Australian National
Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207; Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124
CLR 468; New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 (‘Seas and Submerged
Lands Case’);Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1; Commonwealth
v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian DamCase’);Grain Pool (WA) v Commonwealth
(2000) 202 CLR 479; XYZ v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532; New South Wales
v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (‘Work Choices Case’); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233
CLR 307; Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441 (‘Same Sex
Marriage Case’).
79 This may be contrasted with a more restrictive approach applied to those few legislative
powers expressly reserved to the states: Bourke v State Bank of New SouthWales (1990) 170
CLR 276, 288.
80 Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 396–7 (‘Payroll Tax Case’).
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sympathetic to the expansion of central power,81 to reverse Cigamatic.
Although it could scarcely be regarded as essential to it, the Cigamatic
doctrine complements the reality of the gradual evolution towards the
dominance of the Commonwealth.
VI Conclusion: The Continuing Legacy of Uther’s Case
The basic idea espoused by Dixon J in Uther’s Case – that the relations
between the Commonwealth and its subjects are not properly the domain
of state legislative power – remains the accepted doctrine of the Court.
The doctrine itself and its foundations have been referred to with express
or apparent approval in various cases in the decades following the decision
in Cigamatic.82
In Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte Defence Hous-
ing Authority (‘Residential Tenancies Tribunal’), a majority of the Court
appeared to accept and reiterate this central aspect of Dixon J’s analysis
in Uther’s Case.83 Despite this, it was accepted that neither ‘the Crown
nor its agents [presumably meaning the Commonwealth] enjoy any spe-
cific immunity from the operation of laws of general application, State or
federal’.84 A majority in Residential Tenancies Tribunal took issue with the
awkward distinction between state laws that ‘bind’ the Commonwealth
and those merely ‘affecting’ the Commonwealth,85 but the new distinc-
tion between a law which modifies or impairs Commonwealth execu-
tive ‘capacities’ and a law ‘which assumes those capacities and merely
seeks to regulate activities . . . which it carrie[s] on in common with other
citizens’86 seems no more satisfactory, and was ultimately defended as
resting on the same fundamental principles.
Only time will tell to what extent the Residential Tenancies Tribunal
represents a ‘watered down’ version of the Commonwealth immunity
81 See, eg, Anne Twomey, ‘Reforming Australia’s Federal System’ (2008) 26 Federal Law
Review 57, 78; James Allan and Nicholas Aroney, ‘An Uncommon Court: How the High
Court of Australia Has Undermined Australian Federalism’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review
245, 290–1.
82 See, eg, Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 373 (Barwick CJ; Owen J agreeing), 410
(Walsh J); Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 85 (Gummow, Crennan
and Bell JJ); Australian Postal Commission v Dao (1985) 3 NSWLR 565, 595–9 (McHugh
JA).
83 (1997) 190 CLR 410, 424–5 (Brennan CJ), 440–1 (Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 451
(McHugh J).
84 Ibid 443 (Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
85 Ibid 447 (Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
86 Ibid 438–9 (Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
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doctrine: it appears to remain more than merely a reciprocal application
of the Melbourne Corporation doctrine.87 In any event, the foundations
underlying Dixonian federal theory appear to have endured.88
Justice Dixon’s reasoning in Uther’s Case also remains influential in
more subtle ways. Thus, for example, in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation,
Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ, referencingCigamatic, spoke of ‘the com-
parative superiority of the position of the Commonwealth in the federal
structure’ as a ‘difficulty’ confronting a submission advanced in that case
to the effect that the executive power, whether of the Commonwealth or
a state, ‘continues to be subservient to legislative power irrespective of
whether the source of the legislative power is State or Commonwealth’.89
In Hughes v The Queen, six Justices of the Court accepted, apparently
without the need for express justification, the proposition that ‘a State by
its laws cannot unilaterally invest functions under that law in officers of
the Commonwealth’.90 In the later case of O’Donoghue v Ireland it was
said that ‘[a]n important difference betweenHughes and the present pro-
ceedings is that here the officers in question are those of a State, not the
Commonwealth, and the conferral of authority is by a law of the Com-
monwealth, the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth)’.91 In the latter case, a majority
of the Court accepted that the unilateral imposition by a law of the Com-
monwealth of functionsor powerson statemagistrateswas constitutionally
permissible, but left open the questionwhetherCommonwealth law could
unilaterally impose duties on state officers.92 This lopsided approach to
the ‘cross-vesting’ of executive power can only be explained by reference
87 SeeResidential Tenancies Tribunal (1997) 190 CLR 410. According to Brennan J, ‘the States
have no legislative power that can modify a grant of power to the Crown in right of the
Commonwealth by a lawof theCommonwealth nor any legislative power that canmodify a
prerogative power conferred by theConstitution’ and theMelbourne Corporation principle
‘is irrelevant to the scope of any State legislative power’: at 424–6. Justices Dawson, Toohey
and Gaudron stated that ‘[i]n the application of the principle, however, it is necessary to
differentiate between the Commonwealth on the one hand and the States on the other’:
at 440.
88 Notably, however, Bradley Selway QC expressed the view that ‘[t]he majority necessarily
rejected the reasoning that supported Cigamatic, although . . . they were remarkably coy
about saying so’: Bradley Selway, ‘The Nature of the Commonwealth: A Comment’ (1998)
20 Adelaide Law Review 95, 99.
89 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 85–6.
90 (2000) 202 CLR 535, 553 (Gleeson CJ,McHugh, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan
JJ).
91 (2007) 234 CLR 599, 619 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
92 Ibid 614, 623 (Gleeson CJ), 630 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
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to considerations of the kind that motivated Dixon J’s dissent in Uther’s
Case.
Despite its difficulties, Dixon J’s conception of federation ‘remains of
continuing importance’.93 The Dixonian view of the Australian federa-
tion continues to reverberate in contemporary assumptions concerning
the relationship between the Commonwealth and the states. Thus has a
controversial and imperfect dissent, penned by a great judge, become a
great dissent.
93 Hayne, above n 46, 220.
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